One need not follow Heidegger through all the complexities of his thought, nor need one maintain that in his account of Dasein he meant to give an account, partial or complete, of the human person. What is important to note is the shift of emphasis he effected, and the way this has altered the approach taken to the question of person by those inspired by him. For, it is said, if one reflects on what is really first for us in our everyday experience, one will begin to see the force of the idea that what we are as persons shows itself to us in our projects, our plans, our hopes and fears, our joys, our boredom, our dealings with tools and things available to use, our escapings into the comfortable anonymities of the 'they', our being stretched out, through these features, from, to and in time; in short our preoccupation with, and care for, the fate of our own being. This, it is said, is the great merit of the Heideggerian analysis for the philosophy of person: he opens up a wholly fresh perspective. And this is something the Boethian definition cannot hope to emulate. Boethius, one might say, is just not in the same conceptual space; he belongs to a different focus of philosophical attention and one, moreover, that blinds and obscures for us those primal realities of our lived being that Heidegger has made it possible for us to recover.
One can see just how bad Boethius's definition is from this perspective by noting that all the things that form our lived experience would, when put into Boethian terminology, be labeled accidents. This makes Boethius's definition appear quite perverse.
What is prior and more significant it relegates to a category that is inferior and secondary (for 'accident' ontologically is posterior to substance). Any philosophy that makes what is essential to person to be non-essential must be hopelessly wrong-headed. It has not even reached to the level of discerning what it is that needs to be analyzed.
Some Answers
Boethius's definition is, however, not as hopeless as all this makes it appear. First of all, it is difficult to see how one can get rid of the idea of substance. The terms of traditional metaphysics also have their roots in basic phenomena of experience. Indeed substance is meant in such a way as hardly to beg any questions against Heidegger and his followers. It is drawn from the simple recognition of the being-there of things, or from the fact that things are. Persons are just as are trees, dogs and stars. Of course the way these things are differs from one to the other; and it may be that persons are in a sense that is so different from the way non-persons are that the analysis of them ought to be conducted quite differently. But none of this is prevented by calling persons substances. All that this means in the context is that when talking about persons we are talking about original realities, or things that are in their own right and are not moments parasitic on something else that is in its own right (as say the colour of the dog is only by being of the dog, and not otherwise). It is evident that those who speak of persons are speaking of such original beings, even if they do not expressly say this.
But whatever one may say about Heidegger and Heideggerians, it seems evident that empiricist accounts of person are in need of a notion of substance. The reason for this derives from the phenomenon of time. Time is divided according to moments as extension is divided according to points, but it is not divided into moments, any more than extension is divided into points. For a moment has no duration and a point has no extension, and one will never get any duration by adding moments just as one will not get any extension by adding points. Moments and points are the divisions of duration and extension, not their parts; so that time is what lies between moments and extension what lies between points. In the case of time this means in particular that to be in time is not to be in a moment (nothing exists in a moment) but to be during moments. If one continually pares down time to the simply present, that is the present 'now' without past or future, the present contracts into ever smaller durations (this minute now, this second now, this millisecond now) until it vanishes altogether into the total absence of any duration at all. So if what is in time is not in a moment but during moments, then it is not in the present moment either but through the present from the past into the future. 8 In other words whatever is must endure through time and through the change that time measures. But notoriously Hume, the archetypal empiricist, denied that anything existed through time; time for him is the succession of discrete sense-contents or impressions and ideas. 9 A discrete sense-content, because it is not successive, cannot on his premises be in time or temporally extended. It exists, if it exists, in a single moment; which is to say it does not exist at all. So if person is explained as a succession of conscious states in this sense, then it will be dissolved into nothingness.
It does not help either to posit the body as the locus of these contents, because body too is analyzed into a collection of ideas and impressions that are just as fleeting. If person is to be at all (or indeed if anything is to be) it must be something that is not such a collection. It must be something or a collection of somethings that endures through time.
But what is it to endure through time? It is to be identically the same now as then or later, and hence to be the same despite any changes that happen between the now and the then and the later. But once one has admitted that a thing can remain despite changes occurring in it, one is no longer obliged to say a thing is the same now as then because there is a chain of events, experiences or whatever, that can be traced in a continuous succession from then to now; one can be more bold and say it is that which endures or can endure throughout the successions. In that case the thing is not the succession but the subject of the succession of changes. So a person is not a collection or succession of experiences but that which (successively) has them. And this is no other than what is meant by substance.
Once this is admitted it is easy to admit individual substance. This criticism is based on a rather mechanical interpretation of the substance/accident distinction, an interpretation that treats accidents as if they were some sort of separate entity stuck onto substance like external bits. But this is quite erroneous.
Substances do not have accidents in some external fashion, they are through their accidents (one should not forget that, even in the classical and medieval tradition, the substance/accident distinction, though regarded as necessary and real, is nevertheless an abstraction made by the mind from within what in reality is a single whole). Accidents are the ways of substance, how substance expresses itself; they are not things in themselves; they are of substance and substance is in accidents. In that case substance without its accidents, its expressings, is incomplete and imperfect; for it is through them that it is articulated in the ways of its being. This is especially so in the case of activity and operation. A thing's acting is not its substance in the sense that it would cease to be if it In this sense to talk of accidents is not to talk of the inferior or lesser, for truly to speak of accidents is to speak of substance, but substance understood as articulated and perfected through its ways of being, not as bare standing out from nothingness. If substance by itself is first in the order of mere existence, substance as formed through its ways of being is first in the order of perfection and completion.
But if this is so why not state this in the definition of person, that it is not substance that is being talked about but formed and articulated substance? The answer is clear enough.
To do this would imply that only perfect and actually energized persons are persons, and that would be absurd, for it would mean that young humans or humans asleep were not persons. In fact even those who advert to such features as capacity to value life or enter into meaningful relationships with others talk of the capacity to do this, not the actual doing of it. And the same will apply to all the features of lived experience, for those who talk about lived experience as central to the idea of person are not claiming that one is always enjoying this lived experience, or that the experience is present all at once and not given successively over time. What they are claiming is that a person is through these experiences, or that it is by these experiences that one is able to identify those capacities (i.e. the capacity for this sort of experience) that distinguish persons from non-persons. So all one should need to do to identify persons is to identify substance along with this capacity or collection of capacities. But surely this is just what Boethius intends in speaking of rational nature, for he intends this to be the root or ground of the lived experience of person, i.e. that dimension of this substance that makes it this sort of substance and not the substance that a tree or a stone is.
Since the whole discussion of abortion and whether and to what extent foetuses and neonates are persons hinges on the terms 'potential ' and 'capacity', there is no reason to think that Boethius's definition is irrelevant here. In any case what needs clarifying is the various kinds of capacity or potential, and what sort of closeness to actual exercise of them is required to constitute a being as a person. This is an involved question, no doubt, but it contains nothing fatal to Boethius's definition.
One might still object that Boethius's definition is defective on the ground that it says nothing about the body. One could, of course, easily remedy this by adding 'bodily' or 'animal' to 'rational' in the definition. Then one will get a definition of the human being that will not run the risk of ignoring all the consequences for the human being of its being physically embodied, for these will be forced on one's attention as soon as one starts analyzing what it is to be an animated reasoning body. Also one will not run the risk of incoherence, if trying to identify person without reference to body is incoherent. Boethius's definition (which could include all the above as well as a lot more) but various modern alternatives that are most likely to distort the phenomenon of person, or narrow it down to exclude part of the rich variety that is really there. It may be that some features are more distinctive or central than others, but if they all belong, then they should not be excluded, explicitly or implicitly.
In conclusion then, I think it may be said that Boethius's definition is by no means an obvious non-starter for the philosophy of person. In fact in many respects it may be the best one. In which case a philosophy of person grounded on that definition is going to be more accurate and more compelling than others. It will also direct attention back to key ideas such as nature, reason and substance, that are in particular need of close analysis, and which may yield more fruitful results than even the term 'person' by itself, or any of the moral and other features mentioned earlier. Such a philosophy of person may prove to be a better way to sort out the problems of person than any current alternative.
